Analysis of moral hazard in Engineering agent construction system

Lihua Wang (Logistics University of People’s Armed Police Force)
Shuguang Zhou (Logistics University of People’s Armed Police Force)
Yuetong Hui (Logistics University of People’s Armed Police Force)

Article ID: 1634


Analyze the moral hazard issues in the construction agency system, and enumerate the performance of moral hazard. Deeply analyze the causes, start with strengthening supervision and perfecting incentive measures, eliminate the impact of moral hazard, and give play to the advantages of agent construction.


Engineering agent construction system; Moral hazard

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